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Abstract
In conversation, a person sometimes has to refer to
an object that is not previously known to the other
participant. We present a plan-based model of how
agents collaborate on reference of this sort. In mak-
ing a reference, an agent uses the most salient at-
tributes of the referent. In understanding a reference,
an agent determines his confidence in its adequacy as
a means of identifying the referent. To collaborate,
the agents use judgment, suggestion, and elaboration
moves to refashion an inadequate referring expres-
sion.
1 Introduction
In conversation, a person sometimes has to refer to
an object that is not previously known to the other
participant. One particular situation in which this
arises is in giving directions. For example:
Example 1
1 A: Go straight ahead until you get to a funny-
looking building.
The hearer has to understand the reference well
enough that when he later reaches the building, he
will recognize it as the intended referent.
A reference of this sort is often achieved through a
collaboration between the conversants. In such cases,
the speaker has the goal of having the hearer know
how to identify an object. The speaker attempts to
achieve this goal by building a description of the ob-
ject that she believes will give the hearer the ability
to identify it when it is possible to do so. The hearer
needs to be confident that the description will be ad-
equate as a means of identifying the referent, but be-
cause of the inevitable differences in beliefs about the
world, he might not be. When the hearer is not con-
fident, the speaker and hearer collaborate to make
a new referring expression that the hearer believes is
adequate. This can be seen in the following portion of
a telephone conversation recorded by Psathas (1991,
p. 196).
Example 2
1 A: Ya just stay on 2A, until ya get to Lowell
Street.
2 B: Is it marked?
3 A: Yeah, I think there’s a street sign there, it’s
an intersection with lights.
4 B: Okay.
In this dialogue, speaker B is not confident that he
will be able to identify the intersection at Lowell
Street, and so suggests that the intersection might
be marked. Speaker A replies with an elaboration
of the initial expression, and B finds that he is now
confident, and so accepts the reference.
This type of reference is different from the type
that has been studied traditionally by researchers
who have usually assumed that the agents have mu-
tual knowledge of the referent (Appelt, 1985a; Appelt
and Kronfeld, 1987; Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986;
Heeman and Hirst, 1992; Searle, 1969), are copresent
with the referent (Heeman and Hirst, 1992; Cohen,
1981), or have the referent in their focus of atten-
tion (Reiter and Dale, 1992). In these theories, the
speaker has the intention that the hearer either know
the referent or identify it immediately.
Although the type of reference that we wish to
model does not rely on these assumptions, we can
nevertheless draw from these theories. Thus, we
base our model on the work of Clark and Wilkes-
Gibbs (1986), and Heeman and Hirst (1992) who both
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modeled (the first psychologically, and the second
computationally) how people collaborate on reference
to objects for which they have mutual knowledge. We
will briefly discuss these models, before we describe
our own.
2 Collaboration on reference
In their fundamental experiment, Clark and Wilkes-
Gibbs (1986) demonstrated that conversants use a
set of inherently collaborative procedures to estab-
lish the mutual belief that the hearer has understood
a reference. In the experiment, two subjects were
each given a set of hard-to-describe tangram figures
that were kept hidden from the other. One subject
was required to get the other subject to rearrange
his set to match the ordering of her set, and to do
so through conversation alone. Thus, the two sub-
jects were obliged to collaborate on constructing de-
scriptions of the figures that would allow them to be
unambiguously identified; for example, the one that
looks like an angel with a stick.
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs developed the following
process model to explain their findings. To initiate
the process, speaker A presents an initial version of a
referring expression on which speaker B passes judg-
ment. B can either accept it, reject it, or postpone his
decision until later. If B rejects or postpones, then
the expression must be refashioned by either A or B.
Refashionings are accomplished in three main ways:
repairing the expression by correcting speech errors,
expanding the expression by adding more qualifica-
tions, or replacing part or all of the expression with
new qualifications. Each judgment/refashioning pair
operates on the current referring expression, replac-
ing it with a new one. This process continues until the
expression, kept in the participants’ common ground,
is mutually accepted.
This excerpt from Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs’s data
illustrates rejection (line 2), replacement (line 2), and
acceptance (lines 3 and 4):
Example 3
1 A: Okay, and the next one is the person that
looks like they’re carrying something and it’s
sticking out to the left. It looks like a hat
that’s upside down.
2 B: The guy that’s pointing to the left again?
3 A: Yeah, pointing to the left, that’s it! [laughs]
4 B: Okay.
Heeman and Hirst (1992) rendered Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs’s model computationally by casting it
into the planning paradigm. Their model covers both
the initiator of a referring action, and the recipient
who tries to understand the reference. In this model,
the initiator has the goal of having the recipient iden-
tify the referent, and so constructs a referring plan
given a set of beliefs about what the recipient be-
lieves. The result of the initiator’s plan is a set of sur-
face speech actions, and hearing only these actions,
the recipient tries to infer a plan in order to under-
stand the reference. Thus, referring expressions are
represented as plan derivations, and an unsuccessful
referring expression is an invalid plan in whose repair
the agents collaborate.
An agent can infer a plan even if it is invalid in that
agent’s view (Pollack, 1990). The evaluation process
attempts to find an instantiation of the variables such
that all of the constraints are satisfied and the mental
actions executable with respect to the hearer’s beliefs
about the speaker’s beliefs.
If the recipient finds the initial referring expres-
sion plan invalid, then the agents will collaborate in
its repair. Heeman and Hirst used plan repair tech-
niques to refashion an expression, and used discourse
plans, or meta-plans, to communicate the changes to
it. Thus, a collaborative dialogue is modeled in terms
of the evolution of the referring plan.
First, an agent must communicate that she has
not understood a plan. Depending on how the re-
ferring plan constrains the choice of referent, she
constructs an instance of either reject-plan or
postpone-plan, whose resulting surface speech ac-
tions are s-reject and s-postpone respectively.
Next, one agent or the other must refashion the re-
ferring expression plan in the context of the judg-
ment by either replacing some of its actions (by us-
ing replace-plan) or by adding new actions to it (by
using expand-plan). The result of both plans is the
surface speech action s-actions.
Because the model can play the role of both the ini-
tiator and the recipient, and because it can perform
both plan construction and inference, two copies of
the model can converse with one another, acting al-
ternately as speaker and hearer. Acting as hearer,
one copy of the system performs plan inference on
each set of surface speech actions that it observes,
and updates the state of the collaboration. It then
switches roles to become the speaker, and looks for
a goal to adopt, and constructs a plan that achieves
it. After responding with the surface actions of the
plan, it updates the state of the collaboration, pre-
supposing that the other copy will accept the plan.
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The system repeats the process until it can find no
more goals to adopt, at which time it switches back
to being the hearer and waits for a response from the
other copy.
3 Confidence and salience
A crucial assumption of Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs’s
work—and of Heeman and Hirst’s model—is that the
recipient of the initial referring expression already has
some knowledge of the referent in question. In Clark
and Wilkes-Gibbs’s experiments, for example, it is
one of the tangram figures. In other words, the hearer
can understand a referring expression if its content
uniquely describes an object that he knows about.
Obviously, an agent cannot use this criterion to un-
derstand the reference to the building in Example 1—
he has never heard of the building before. What cri-
teria, then, does he base his understanding on?
The basis of our model is that the hearer can accept
a referring expression plan if (1) the plan contains a
description that is useful for making an identifica-
tion plan that the hearer can execute to identify the
referent, and (2) the hearer is confident that the iden-
tification plan is adequate.
The first condition, originally described by Ap-
pelt (1985b), is important because the success of the
referring action depends on the hearer formulating
a useful identification plan. We take the referring
expression plan itself to be the identification plan.
The mental actions in the plan will encode only use-
ful descriptions. For the second condition to hold,
the hearer must believe that the identification plan is
good enough to uniquely identify the referent when
it becomes visible. This involves giving enough in-
formation by using the most salient attributes of the
referent.
In our model, each agent associates a numeric con-
fidence value with each of the attributes in the refer-
ring expression, and by composing these, computes a
level of confidence in the adequacy of the complete
referring expression plan that can be interpreted as
ranging from low confidence to high confidence. The
present composition function is simple addition, but
one could envision more complex systems to compute
confidence, such as an algebra of confidence or a non-
numeric system. If the overall confidence value ex-
ceeds some set value, the agent’s confidence threshold,
then the agent believes the plan is adequate. That is,
if the agent is the initiator, she believes that the other
will be able to understand the reference; if the agent
is the other, he believes that he has understood the
reference.
Now, the confidence value of each attribute is
equivalent to its salience within the context of the
referring expression. Salience, for our purposes in
direction-giving, is primarily visual prominence, but
can also involve identifiability, familiarity, and func-
tional importance (Devlin, 1976; Lynch, 1960). One
approach is to encode the salient properties in a static
hierarchy as Davis (1989), and Reiter and Dale (1992)
have done.1 But, ideally, salience should depend on
the context surrounding the referent. For example,
the height of a tall building would normally be salient,
but not if it were surrounded by other tall buildings.
This computation would be quite complex, so we have
adopted a middle ground between the simple context-
independent approaches, and a full-blown contextual
analysis. The middle ground involves taking the type
of object into account when choosing attributes and
landmarks that relate to it. For example, height and
architectural style can be very salient features for de-
scribing a building, but not for describing an inter-
section, for which having a sign or traffic lights is
important. This approach still allows us to encode
salience in a hierarchy, but it is dependent on the
referent.
Table 1 shows an example of a simple salience hi-
erarchy that an agent might have. The hierarchy is
actually a set of partial orderings of attributes, rep-
resented by lambda expressions, indexed by object
type. In the table, the confidence value of using ar-
chitectural style to describe a building is 4. The confi-
dence value of a tall building is 3, and so this attribute
is less salient than architectural style. The other rows
(for describing intersections) follow similarly.2
Each agent has his own beliefs about salience. It
is the difference in their beliefs that leads to the ne-
cessity for collaboration on reference. Ideally, the ini-
tiator should construct referring expressions with the
recipients’ (believed) beliefs about salience in mind,
but we have chosen to avoid this complexity by mak-
ing the simplifying assumption that the initiator is
an expert (and thus knows best what is salient).
4 Plans for referring
An agent uses his salience hierarchy for two related
purposes: the first to determine what is salient in
a particular situation, and the second to determine
the adequacy of a description. So, the hierarchy is
1 These models assume that all agents have identical beliefs,
which is clearly insufficient for modeling collaborative dialogue.
2 Given information about salience, we could construct such
a hierarchy, but we do not presume that it would be easy to
know what is salient.
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Table 1: A salience hierarchy for an agent.
salient-attribute(4, building, λX ·architectural-style(X,Style)).
salient-attribute(3, building, λX ·height(X,tall)).
salient-attribute(3, intersection, λX ·called(X,Name)).
salient-attribute(2, intersection,sign, λX ·λY ·has(X,Y)).
salient-attribute(2, intersection,traffic-lights, λX ·λY ·has(X,Y)).
accessed during both plan construction and plan in-
ference.
In plan construction, the hierarchy is used for con-
structing initial referring expression plans, and for
elaborating on inadequate plans by allowing an agent
to choose the most salient properties of the referent
first. The agent constructs an initial referring expres-
sion plan in almost the same way as in Heeman and
Hirst’s system. Mental actions in the intermediate
plans of a referring expression plan allow the speaker
to choose the most salient attributes that have not
yet been chosen, and constraints in the surface speech
actions make sure the speaker believes that each at-
tribute is true.3 Other mental actions in the inter-
mediate plans add up the confidence values of the
attributes, and a final constraint makes sure that the
sum exceeds the agent’s confidence threshold. So, for
a referring plan to be valid, it must describe a unique
object, and it must be adequate with respect to the
speaker’s beliefs. This means that attributes beyond
those required for a unique description could be nec-
essary. For example, to construct the reference to
the building in Example 1, the speaker consulted her
salience hierarchy (in table 1) and determined that
architectural style is salient. Hence, she described
the building as funny-looking. This single attribute
was enough to exceed her confidence threshold.
During plan inference, the salience hierarchy is
used when evaluating a recognized plan. The men-
tal actions in the intermediate plans determine the
confidence values of each attribute (from the hearer’s
salience hierarchy), and add them up. The final con-
straint in the plan makes sure that the hearer’s con-
fidence threshold is exceeded. Thus, judging the ad-
equacy of a referring expression plan falls out of the
regular plan evaluation process. If the final constraint
does not hold, then the invalidity is noted so that the
plan can be operated on appropriately by the dis-
3 In Heeman and Hirst’s model, an attribute has to be mu-
tually believed to be used. Here, mutual belief is not possible
because the hearer has no knowledge of the referent, but mu-
tual belief is an intended effect of using this plan.
course plans.
For example, after recognizing the reference in Ex-
ample 1, the hearer evaluates the plan. Assuming he
believes the salience information in table 1, he com-
putes the confidence value of 4. If this value exceeds
his confidence threshold, then he will accept the plan.
If not, he will believe that there is an error at the con-
straint that checks his confidence threshold.
5 Suggestion and elaboration
If the recipient is not confident in the adequacy of the
plan, he uses an instance of postpone-plan to inform
the initiator that he is not confident of its adequacy,
thereby causing the initiator to raise her own confi-
dence threshold. Now, although he cannot refashion
the expression himself, he does have the ability to
help the initiator by suggesting a good way to expand
it; suggestion is a conversational move in which an
agent suggests a new attribute that he deems would
increase his confidence in the expression’s adequacy
if the expression were expanded to include the at-
tribute. Continuing with the example, if the hearer
were not confident about the adequacy of the funny-
looking building, he might suggest that the initiator
use height (as well as architectural style), by asking
Is it tall?. From this suggestion the initiator might
expand her expression to the tall funny-looking build-
ing. So, in our sense, a suggestion is an illocutionary
act of questioning; along with actually suggesting a
way to expand a plan, the agent is asking whether or
not the referent has the suggested attribute.
To decide what suggestion to make, the agent uses
an instance of suggest-expand-plan, which has a
mental action in its decomposition that chooses the
attribute that he believes is the most salient that has
not been used already. The result of the plan is the
surface speech action, s-suggest, that communicates
the suggestion.
However, only the initiator of the referring expres-
sion can actually elaborate a referring expression, be-
cause only she has the knowledge to do so. Depend-
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ing on whether the hearer of the expression makes a
suggestion or not, the initiator has two options when
elaborating a plan. If no suggestion was made, then
she can expand the plan according to her own be-
liefs about the referent’s attributes and their salience.
On the other hand, if a suggestion was made, she
could instead attempt to expand the plan by affirm-
ing or denying the attribute suggested. If possible,
she should use the suggestion to elaborate the plan,
thus avoiding unwanted conversational implicature,
but its use may not be enough to make the plan ad-
equate.
The decomposition of expand-plan calls the
plan constructor with the goal of constructing a
modifiers schema and with the suggested attribute
as input—in a sense, continuing the construction of
the initial referring plan. The plan constructor at-
tempts to find a plan with the surface speech actions
for the suggested attribute in its yield, but this might
not be possible. In any case, the speaker constructs
an expansion that will make the plan adequate ac-
cording to her beliefs.4
The response to a suggestion depends, obviously,
on whether or not the suggestion was used to expand
the plan. The speaker can (1) affirm that the plan was
expanded with the suggestion by using the s-affirm
speech act; (2) affirm that the suggestion was used,
along with additional attributes that weren’t sug-
gested, by using s-affirm and s-actions; or (3)
deny the suggestion with s-deny, and inform the
other by s-actions as to how the plan was expanded.
By repeatedly using the postponement, elabora-
tion, and suggestion moves, the two agents collab-
orate through discourse on refashioning the referring
expression until they mutually believe that the recip-
ient is confident that it is adequate.
6 Example
We have implemented the model in Prolog. Table 2
shows the input/output of two copies of the sys-
tem engaging in a simplified version of Example 2.
Note that the system generates and understands ut-
terances in the form of descriptions of the surface
speech actions, not surface natural language forms.
The existence of a parser and a generator that can
map between the two forms is assumed. Complete
details of this example and of the model are given by
Edmonds (1993).
4 Recall that she raised her confidence threshold as a result
of the hearer’s postponement move, so now she must meet the
new threshold.
7 Conclusion
When an agent refers to a particular object that is
not previously known to another agent, she has the
intention that the agent be able to identify the object
(when it is possible to do so) by means of the refer-
ring expression. Because of the inevitable differences
in their beliefs about the world—specifically about
what is salient—the agents may have to collaborate
to make the expression adequate.
We have implemented a computational plan-based
model that accounts for the collaborative nature
of reference in the domain of interactive direction-
giving. An agent constructs a referring expression
plan by using the referent’s most salient features. An
agent understands a reference once he is confident
in the adequacy of its (inferred) plan as a means of
identifying the referent. To collaborate, the agents
use judgment, suggestion, and elaboration moves to
refashion the referring expression until they mutually
believe that the recipient has understood.
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